V.3 No 1

5

Notice on physical Absolute

We cannot describe the field, having not studied prematurely its structure! The cited relativists' primitivism is admissible only at the condition, when the regularities are known, no step further.

Of course, when the classical physics has described the regularities of fields, basing on the concept of aether as the material substance and the Newtonian Absolute as the basic reference frame in which the properties of studied phenomena reveal in the most typical way; when in frames of classical formalism the system of mapping and visualisation has been developed, one can reject the entire phenomenology, silently supposing that the classical results are correct:

"In the Newton's gravitation theory, the gravitation acceleration caused by the given large mass is proportional to this mass and inversely proportional to the squared distance to this mass. The same law can be formulated in some other way, but with it we will obtain the guiding line to the relativistic gravity law. This another formulation is based on the idea of gravity field as of something embedded in the vicinity of the large gravitating mass, irrespectively of, whether there were trial bodies or not" [ibidem, p. 92].

"Thus, the problem of gravitation has been reduced to the mathematical problem: it is called to find the simplest metric relationships covariant as to the arbitrary transformation of co-ordinates. This is a strictly limited problem, well accessible to solve" [Einstein: 18, p. 282].

But we should not forget that Newton, having substantiated his gravity law, emphasised:

"Up to now I stated the celestial phenomena and tides of our seas on the basis of the gravity force, but I did not indicate the reasons of gravity itself. … The reason of these properties of the gravity force I still could not derive from the phenomena, and I do not invent the hypotheses. This all that is not derivable from the phenomena we have to call the hypothesis, and the hypotheses metaphysical, physical, mechanical, grounded on latent properties are out of place in the experimental philosophy. In such philosophy the suppositions are derived from the phenomena and generalised with the help of induction" [Newton: 2].

Surely, striving to reject the Newtonian Absolute, one can reject also his homily and caution, but when one has to formulate independently…

"After we obtained the expression for the energy-pulse for material phenomena (mechanical, electrical and others) in concern to the gravity field, we face also the following problem. Let we have some tensor given for the material system. Which will be the differential equations allowing to determine the values g_ik , i.e. the gravity field? In other words, we are seeking the generalisation of Poisson's equation

To solve this problem, we did not find the technique which would be as natural as in case of previous problem. We had to introduce some far from obvious, though probable admission.

The sought equation, in all probability, should have the following form:

where is the constant, and    is the second-rank counter-variant tensor formed of derivatives of the basic tensor g_ik .

In accordance with the Newton - Poisson law, it is a good plan to require, these equations (13) to be the second-order equations. However we should make an objection that this supposition disables us to find the differential expression being the generalisation of , which would be tensor with respect to the arbitrary transformation. We should not state a priori that the final exact equations for gravitation cannot involve the derivatives higher than second order. So still there is a possibility that final differential equations for gravitation may be covariant with respect to the arbitrary transformation. However with our today knowledge of physical properties of gravity field, it would be before-time to discuss such possibility. This is why we have to confine ourselves to the second-order equations and, consequently, to turn down the search of gravity equations being covariant as to the arbitrary transformation. However we have to emphasise that we have no grounds for the general covariance of the gravity equations" [Einstein: 22, p. 236- 237].

Nothing difficult to grasp, what follows from such approach to the basic problem of space-time, if one unconcealedly oversimplified the very philosophy of physics; if one not resolved but simply put off, ignored the discrepancies without any solution, if one turned the mathematical formalism into some a priori tool to symbolise the record of desirable result. Here is a sample of one of such "insights":

"Before we agree with the Einstein's view, it would be appropriate to ask, whether the space-time actually has unambiguously and sequentially the pseudo-Riemann structure. It depends on the presence in nature the exact clock and on, whether such clock locally obey the laws of partial relativity, or on, whether two clocks being put together will go each the same, irrespectively of the chosen place or of their previous history. Seemingly, the fact of existence of the exact clock has a closest concern to the quantum nature of matter. In the end this reduces to the fact that some natural frequency v  corresponds to any mass m   (through the Planck's constant h ), because from the Einsteinian law for the mass and energy E = mc²  and Planck's formula E = h (if we take the unity system in which the velocity of light c = 1 ), … we will yield

So each basic particle sets some scale of time concerned with its own mass of rest m . We can think this scale as a sequence of time 'marks' along the world line of the particle (the author's footnote: The Planck's frequencies of particles are utterly high and practically cannot serve as the clock. The corresponding Planck's frequencies of compound systems appear even higher! As a matter of fact, the frequencies which are used in atom clocks are obtained as the mass difference (as if 'beats') ), which by definition are distanced from each other v^-1   apart. In this way the interval ds  along the world line of particle is determined, and if we assume the world line variation, we will obtain ds   for any time-like interval. From this the conclusion follows of the pseudo-Riemann structure of space-time, as the partial relativity is locally true to a high degree of accuracy" [Penrose: 24, p. 24].

And the more the relativistic conception is developed the farther it leaves its primary source - the Mach's relativity principle. As long ago as Einstein wrote the following:

"The Relativity is a fine example of contemporary way of development of the basic theory. The initial hypotheses become more and more abstract, more far from sensations. But then we approach the nearer the most important aim of the science - from the minimal number of hypotheses or axioms to obtain logically by way of deduction the maximum of real results. With it the thinkable way from the axioms to the perceptible results or testable corollaries becomes the more longer, the more exquisite. The theoretician is more and more guided in seeking the theories by the mathematical, formal considerations, as the physical experience of the experimenter disables getting straight up to the spheres of the highest abstraction. The place of mainly inductive methods inherent in the youthful stage of the science takes the searching deduction. Furthermore, we have to advance in constructing such theoretical building that to come to the corollaries comparable with the experience. Indeed, the experience remains the almighty judge here, too. But his verdict can follow only after a large and hard mental work that throws a bridge across a precipice between the axioms and corollaries" [Einstein: 18, p. 279- 280].

The circle has locked. Evading the absolute, the Mach's followers had originated even more problematic absolute. It not only did not solve the problems of cognition of the first principles of the universe, but impeded the development of the very knowledge, having dogmatized the physical knowledge, in the utterly simplified and distorted form, at the stage of 19th century. So, if trying to develop the idea of absolute, we have to ground on the knowledge and conception of absolute that were formed by the end of 19th century. Not because after it there was done little, but just because, in order to get out the deadlock of relativism, we have to analyse anew all our subsequent experience, in the view of paradigm that excludes the pernicious influence of the Einsteinian relativism.